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Article 6

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAws-FOREIGN GUARDIAN-CUSTODY OF WARD-

In May, 1926, Mrs. Chase was regularly pronounced insane by the
courts of Florida. Her brother was designated as her guardian.
He removed her from Florida and placed her in a private sanatorium
in Asheville for treatment. In a recent case' her petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to secure her discharge from the hospital was
denied.
By unanimous opinion the North Carolina Supreme Court announces its adherence to the common law rule that a foreign guardian can exercise no rights and powers over the property or person of
his ward outside the sovereignty which granted him letters of guardianship.2 In this respect the same reasoning which influences the
courts to deny extra-territorial efficacy to letters of administration 3
is applicable.4 While there is abundant authority to sustain that
position, so far as the recognition of a foreign guardian by a local
court ex propria7igore is concerned, 5 the present day tendency is to
give effect to such foreign appointment by way of comity., In fact
the leading English decision on this subject is to the effect that if
there is a foreign guardian properly appointed at the domicile of the
ward, the English courts will recognize him and give effect to his
powers, even though an English guardian had been appointed for
the same ward. 7 In a few American cases extra-territorial authority
of a guardian has been admitted, even in opposition to a domestic or
1

in re Chase, 195 N. C. 143, 141 S. E. 471 (1928).
Conflict of Laws, sec. 499; Grimmett v. Witherington, 16 Ark.
377, 63 Am.Dec. 66 (1853).
'Wolfe v. Bank of Henderson, 123 S. C. 208, 116 S. E. 451 (1923); Wall v.
American Smelting & Refining Co., 90 N. J. E. 469, 107 Atl. 63 (1919) ; Crabu
v. Clay County Bank, 137 Mo. App. 712, 118 S. W. 498 (1909).
' Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, sec. 189; Miller v. Hoover, 121 Mo. App.
568, 97 S. W. 210 (1906) ; In re Nichols, 21 Nev. 462, 34 Pac. 250 (1893)
Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156, 35 L. Ed. 112 (1890).
'Jones v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439 (1904) ; In re Nichols Estate,
21 Nev. 462, 34 Pac. 250 (1893) ; Morgan v. Patton, 157 U. S. 195, 39 L. Ed.
670 (1895) ; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613, 26 L. Ed. 585 (1880) ; Watts v.
Wilson, 93 Ky. 495, 20 S. W. 505 (1892); Smith v. Wiley, 22 Ala. 396, 58
A. D. 262 (1853).
'New York Foundling Hospital v. Gatti, 79 Pac. 231, and note 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 306 (1905) ; Hanrahan v. Sears, 72 N. H. 71, 54 Atl. 702 (1903) ;
Lamar v. Micon, 112 U. S. 470, 28 L. Ed. 757 (1884) ; Townsend v. Kendall, 4
Minn. 412, 77 Am. Dec. 534 (1860) ; Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen (Mass.).
321 (1862).
TNugent v. Vetzera, L. R. 2 Eq. 704 (1866), cited by Lorenzen, Cases on
Conflict of Laws at page 948.
[ 475 1
2 Story,
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local guardian.8 Manifestly it should not be otherwise where the
guardian has lost the custody of his ward unwillingly or temporarily.
If this were not the rule "a child domiciled out of the state and sent
hither for the purpose of education, or who came into the state by
stealth, or who was brought here by force or fraud might be emancipated from the control of his rightful guardian, duly appointed in the
place of his domicile. . . ."9 And, while there is some authority
for the position that mere temporary residence of a ward is sufficient
to give jurisdiction in the resident state to appoint a guardian, 10 it is
submitted that the proper jurisdiction for guardianship proceedings
is the domicile of the ward."' Some courts have gone so far as to
hold the foreign guardian responsible and accountable for the improper administration of the guardianship, 12 although Goodrich announces the rule to be that a foreign guardian cannot sue nor be
sued outside the state of his appointment.'" Likewise, the courts
will sometimes turn over to a foreign guardian property belonging
to the ward.' 4 In each of these cases the opinion is careful to point
out that the result is obtained on the principle of comity between
sovereigns and not because the foreign guardian is entitled, by any
absolute right, to the person or property of the ward, residing or
located in the local jurisdiction.'5
But it is not enough to say that the tendency of modern decisions
is to recognize foreign authority on the principle of comity. The
practical question immediately presents itself: Under what circumstances and to what extent will courts allow this vague comity to
'See Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen (Mass.), 321 (1862); Townsend v.

Kendall, 4 Minn. 412, 77 Am. Dec. 534 (1860); Grimes v. Butsch, 142 Ind.
113, 41 N. E. 328 (1895) ; Lewis Succession, 10 La. Ann. 789, 63 Am. Dec. 600

(1855).

'Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen (Mass.), 321 (1862).
" Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 Clarke & F. 42 (1843) ; Ross v. S. W. R. R. Co.,

53 Ga. 514 (1874) ; State v. Rhodes, 29 Wash. 61, 69 Pac. 389 (1902) ; Slack
v. Parrine,9 App. D. C. 128 (1896) ; Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61, 104 Atl. 467

(1918) ; In re Burbridge (C. A.), 1 Ch. 426 (1902); Hartman v. Henry, 280
Mo. 478, 217 S. W. 987 (1920).
"Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452, 28 L. Ed. 757 (1884).

"Moore v. Hood, 9 Rich. Eq. (S.C.), 311, 70 Am. Dec. 210 (1857) ; McNamara v Dwyer, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 239, 32 Am. Dec. 627 (1838).
"Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, sec. 189.

" Inre Henining'sEstate, 128 Cal. 214, 60 Pac. 752 (1900) ; In re Benton,

92 Iowa 202, 60 N. W. 614 (1894) ; itre Wilson, 95 Mo. 184, 8 S.W. 369
(1888); Marts v. Brown, 56 Ind. 386 (1887); Earl v. Dresser, 30 Ind. 11, 95
Am. Dec. 660 (1868).
" Supra, note 12; In re Rice, 42 Mich. 528, 4 N. W. 282 (1880) ; People v.
Allen, 105 N. Y. 628, 11 N. E. 143 (1887); In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38

N. W. 876 (1888).

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
shape their decisions?16 Uniformily the basis for such recognition
17
is what the furum considers to be the best interests of the ward,
with the qualification that in doing so it must not violate the settled
public policy of the local sovereign. 18 It is respectfully submitted,
however, that this is not comity at all but rather the law of the local
jurisdiction. However, it is on the purported basis of comity that
the North Carolina court recognizes the authority of the foreign
guardian to proceed under his Florida commission in North Carolina.

C. R.

JoNAs.

CONFLICT OF LAw-FOREIGN RECEIVERS-RIGHT TO SUE IN
LOCAL CoumT-The plaintiff sues as the receiver of the estate of

H. H. Blijdenstin on two notes. Defendant Latham is trustee and
executor of one of the makers of the notes, now deceased. The notes
in question were transferred to plaintiff as receiver, by order of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, from the Alien Property Custodian. Plaintiff was authorized to bring the suit as receiver
by the District Court of Justice at Amsterdam, kingdom of Netherlands; and by order of a judge of the Superior Court, plaintiff was
permitted to institute this suit in the Superior Court of Craven
County. The defendant demurred to the plaintiff's complaint, and
this was sustained. Plaintiff appealed and the judgment was reversed. The court held that the plaintiff, as a foreign receiver, was
entitled to sue in North Carolina as a matter of comity, not of right.'
In the leading case of Booth v. Clark,2 the United States Supreme
Court laid down a contrary rule, holding that the receiver has no
""Of comity it has been said that in theory it is a simple manifestation of
the doctrine of interest, and that in practice, instead of uniting, it isolates and
separates nations; that it confounds two things so distinct as the actual power
and duty of a state . . . that in view of the different ways it may be interpreted,
it will never be able to put into relief the law applicable to each case . . .
comity is a pretext for the evasion of the consequences of a strictly territorial
law . . . authorizes simply concessions ungoverned by rule . . . making cour-

tesy and reciprocity a system of reprisal, instead of a furtherance of juridical
relations." Extracts from De Bustamante, Tratado De Derecho International
and quoted from Lorenzen, Conflict of Laws, 1st Ed. 15.
Privado,
"TJones v. Bonnan, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439 (1904) ; Hanrahan v. Sears,
72 N. H. 71, 54 AtI. 702 (1903) ; Grimes v. Butsch, 142 Ind. 113, 41 N. E. 328
(1895); Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 37 Atl. 679 (1897). See however,
Nugent v. Vetzera, L. R. 2 Eq. 704, in which the English Court refused to
interfere, upon the ground of any supposed benefit to the ward, with a foreign
guardian, who prevailed over a local guardian in the English Court.
'Hoyworth. v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 56 N.'E. 888 (1900) ; Cristilley v.
Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 Atl. 711 (1913).
'Van Kempen v. Latharn (1928), 195 N. C. 389.
' (1854) 17 How. (U. S.) 322, 15 L. Ed. 164.
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extra-territorial power of official action enabling him to go into a
foreign jurisdiction as a matter of right or comity and take possession of the debtor's property. This case has been repeatedly followed in the United States courts and in many state courts.3 The
reason of the rule is that title to the property is not in the receiver.
All the rights which the receiver has in the property are by reason of
the sovereign power through the court taking custody of the property
and making the receiver the representative of this power. This
sovereign power does not extend beyond the confines of the state in
which the receiver is appointed. 4 This view is logically correct if
based on the territorial theory of rights and law as advanced by
Professor Beale, 5 that is that rights are created by law, law is
created by the sovereign, and since the sovereign power extends only
over a given territory the laws created by it can have no effect outside this territory. Hence a decree by the court under those laws can
have no extra-territorial effect. It is also correctly based on the
equitable principle that a decree given by a court of equity has no
force outside the court's territorial jurisdiction, since the court does
not have the power to enforce it.6
In its effect, however, the rule of Booth v. Clark has been limited by two important exceptions. These are: (1) Many state
courts allow the receiver to sue as a matter of comity.7 This courtesy, however, will ordinarily not be extended if it will prejudice
the rights of domestic creditors, causing them the expense and inconvenience of going into a foreign court to collect their claims.8
(2) When title to property or choses in action, in the jurisdiction of
' (1905) Great Western Mining Co. v. Hovis, 198 U. S. 561, 49 L. Ed. 1163;
(1918) Sterret v. Second National Bank, 39 S. C. R. 27, 248 U. S. 73; Clark on
Receivers, Vol. I, page 485; 3 Minn. Law Review 188.
'Clark on the Law of Receivers, Vol. I, page 484; Baltimore Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Alderman (1898), 90 Fed. 142, at 146.
'Treatise on the Conflict of Law (1916), 106. This theory is discussed in
an article by Prof. Cook in 33 Yale Law Journal 457, and the view is presented, that when foreign law is enforced, the court enforcing it adopts it and
enforces it as domestic law, thus doing away with territorial limits. See also
41 Harvard Law Review 421, and 37 Yale Law Journal 468.
'Booth v. Clark, supra.
"Hazlitt v. Woodhead (1907), 28 R. I. 452, 67 At. 737; Howarth v. Lonbard (1900), 175 Mass. 570, 56 N. E. 888; Ward v. Pac. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
(1901), 135 Cal. 235, 67 P. 124; Frowert v. Blount (1903), 205 Pa. 299, 54 Atl.
1000. For other citations see 34 Cyc. 488-note 58. This may he reconciled
with the territorial view on the ground that it is equivalent to appointing him
receiver by the local court.
'Kingen v. Buffalo Bank of Commerce (1898), 123 N. C. 16, 31 S. E. 270;
Van Truye v. Carpenter (1916), 135 Tenn. 629, 188 S. W. 234; Ward v. Pac.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, note 7.
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the court, is vested in the receiver, by statute or conveyance, under
article 4, section 1, of the United States Constitution, courts of
other states must give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings
of the first state establishing such title in the receiver and giving him
power as owner to sue. 9 This is true because the receiver is now a
trustee or quasi-assignee clothed with legal title, seeking to enforce
for the benefit of his cestui que trust a right of action against one
liable thereon.
The principal case falls within the first exception, and is clearly
in accord with the more liberal and progressive view. No domestic
creditors are involved, and the receiver has been identified and
granted permission to sue by a judge of our Superior Court; these
facts amply justify the privileges granted by the court and allowing
the plaintiff a new trial. Although this is contrary to the rule as
to foreign administrators, who are not allowed to sue as such in our
courts,10 it can be reconciled on the ground that we have no statute
disqualifying foreign receivers as C. S. 8 does foreign administrators.
DAN

K. MOORE.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-EXTRATERRI-

judgment in the state of
Washington lives for six years from the date of entry and then becomes dead. In a suit to enforce a Washington judgment, after it
had "ceased to be a charge against the property or person of the
judgment debtor," an Oregon court gave a default judgment thereon.
Washington courts refused to enforce this Oregon judgment since
they "were privileged and have the duty to view that judgment (as
void) in the light of the foundation (an extinct Washington judgment) upon which it rests."1 The United States Supreme Court
reversing the Washington Supreme Court said that it was bound to
give full faith and credit to the Oregon judgment since it was "valid
and conclusive between the parties in that state, it was equally con2
clusive in the courts of Washington."1
Whether the Oregon judgment is valid or void is the root of the
TORIAL EFFECT OF LOCAL STATUTES-A

'Converse v. Hamilton (1911), 224 U. S. 243, 56 L. Ed. 749; Relfe v.

Rundle (1880), 103 U. S. 222, 26 L. Ed. 337.
" Hall v. R. R. (1907), 146 N. C. 345, 59 S. E. 879.

'Roche v. McDonald, 136 Wash. 322; 239 Pac. 1015; 44 L. R. A. 444; 1
Wash. L. Rev. 284; 26 Col. L. Rev. 464 (1925).
'Roche v. McDonald, 48 S. Ct. 142 (1927), commented on in 26 Mich. L.

Rev. 692, 14 Va. L. Rev. 395.
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conflict between the Supreme courts of the United States and Washington. It would seem that the position of the Washington Supreme
Court is maintainable if the Oregon judgment is void.8 Full faith and
credit does not have to be given to judgments of sister states where
such judgments were rendered without jurisdiction of the parties
or the subject matter.4 The position of the Washington Supreme
Court is that the Oregon court lacked jurisdiction in the sense of
power to render judgment and consequently its judgment was void.6
It was apparent to the Washington court that their statutes rendered
extinct the judicial power to extend the life of a Washington judgment for a period of greater than six years. 6 Granting that this had
been held to be the legal effect of the statute in the State of Washington can the Washington judgment law be of the same effect in
Oregon so as to deprive her courts of the jurisdictional power to
render judgment?
It is submitted that upon this point the Washington Supreme
Court fell into error for jurisdiction is to be determined by the law
of the court's creation and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial
operation of a statute of another state. 7 While an Oregon court had
jurisdiction in the sense of power to entertain a suit upon a Washington judgment, no question was raised concerning the effect of the
Washington judgment law. Had that question been raised by putting
in evidence the Washington statute, as provided by Act of Con-

' "The constitutional requirement that full faith and credit shall be given
in each state to the public arts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
state is necessarily to be interpreted in connection with other provisions of
the constitution and therefore no state can obtain in the tribunals of other juris-

dictions full faith and credit for its judicial proceedings if they are wanting
in the due process of law enjoined by the fundamental law." Old Wayne Life
Ass'n. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8; 51 L. Ed. 345; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236 (1907).
' Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S. 141; 51 L. Ed. 745; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434
(1907) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877) ; Irby v. Wlilson,
21 N. C. 568 (1837) ; Mottu v. Davis, 151 N. C. 237; 65 S. E. 969 (1907).
In an action on the judgment of a sister state defendant may plead fraud

in the procurement thereof, Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 482; 55 S. E. 371;
32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 195; 115 Am. St. Rep. 757 (1906). Coke v. Cunningham,

133 U. S.107, 112; 33 L. Ed. 538; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269 (1890).
"Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, Marshall, C. J., "the operation 9f

every judgment must depend on the power of the court to render that judgment."

Crew v. Pratt, 119 Col. 139; 51 Pac. 38, 42 (1877) ; 47 Am. L. Rev.

518 (1913).
"Laws of Wash., 1897 c. 39; Remington's Comp. Statutes, sections 459, 460.
Ball v. Russell, 119 Wash. 206; 205 Pac. 426 (1922).
Tenn. Coal Co. v. George, 233 U. S.354; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 587; 58 L. Ed.
997; L. R. A. 1916 D, 685 (1914).
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gress,8 then to deny to that statute the same credit, validity and
effect that it had in Washington would have been an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the Oregon court and an error as to the law of
Oregon. Such an error in law might render the judgment voidable
if an appeal were taken in Oregon. Therefore, unless the Oregon
judgment is appealed from, it cannot be denied full faith and credit
in the courts of Washington. 9
Thus in the instant case proof of the Washington judgment law
before the Oregon court might have resulted in a dismissal of the
suit by reason of the effect of the full faith and credit clause. But
the Oregon court never considered the effect of the Washington
judgment statute, since it was not presented by reason of the default
of the defendant. The judgment thus valid in Oregon is conclusive,
as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, as to the media
concludendi and entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of
Washington."0
F. B. GummEY II.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-JURISDICTION

OVER NON-RESIDENTS-

The constitutionality of statutes providing that jurisdiction of foreign corporations may be obtained by service on a statutory agent
has moved the legislative bodies of several states to pass similar
statutes with regard to non-resident motorists. The constitutionality
of such a statute was again raised in the recent case of Wuchter v.
Pizzutti,' where a non-resident, operating his automobile in New
'U. S. Rev. St. See. 905; U. S. Comp. St., 1918, p. 206, See. 1520. Courts

of one state are not bound, under Art. 4, Sec. 1 of the U. S. Const., to take
judicial notice of the laws of a sister state. Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones L. 130
(1857) ; Harrison v. Atlantic Coast Line, 168 N. C. 382, 84 S. E. 519 (1915) ;
but see Renaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277; 29 L. Ed. 629; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1194

(1886).
'Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall 290; 18 L. Ed. 475 (1866); Fauntleroy v.
Luin, 210 U. S. 230; 52 L. Ed. 1039; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641 (1908) ; Davidson v.

Sharpe, 28 N. C. 14 (1845); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Crowell, 245 F. 676

(1917).
" In a similar situation the Supreme Court of North Carolina expressed
this same view taken by the Supreme Court of the United States, Ring v.
Whitman, 194 N. C. 544; 140 S. E. 159 (1927).
See also Bonnett-Brown Corp. v. Coble, 195 N. C. 491 (filed April 18,
1928), holding that an Illinois judgment obtained upon warrant of attorney is
enforceable in North Carolina even though the original judgment could not
have been obtained in North Carolina without compliance with C. S., secs. 623,
4, 5. There is a long continue statutory policy involved in prohibiting confessions of judgment on bonds, notes, etc., upon warrant of attorney. Rev.
(1793).
Stat.,
sec.25993 (U.
148Ch.
Sup.31,Ct.
S., 1928).
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Jersey, injured the plaintiff. Service of process was made on the
secretary of state in compliance with a New Jersey statute which
provided that the use of the highway by non-residents should be
deemed equivalent to an appointment of the secretary of state as the
non-resident's agent for service of process in actions arising out
of accidents on New Jersey highways. 2 A judgment for the plaintiff
was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, which held the
statute unconstitutional on the ground that it contained no provision
requiring the secretary of state to notify the defendant. If there
had been such a provision the statute would have been upheld under
the authority of Hess. v. Pawloski.3 That case having been decided,
the dissenting judges 4 claim the objection raised is but an afterthought provoked by that decision, and that it should be left to the
state court to say whether notice was required to be sent to the
defendant under an administrative ruling of the secretary of state
in carrying out the statute.
In an analogous case 5 where the defendant is a foreign corporation, the Virginia statute required process against a foreign corporation to be served on its statutory agent. Another section required every foreign corporation doing business in the state to
appoint the secretary of the commonwealth its agent for service of
process, and required the secretary to mail a copy of the process to
the corporation. Process was issued against the defendant, and the
sheriff's return recited its execution by service on the secretary of
the commonwealth. The defendant appealed from an adverse judgment, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed
to require a recital in the return that the process was actually mailed
to the defendant. This contention was denied and judgment affirmed.
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical control5 within territorial limits. 7 Where the defendant is a non-resident some sort
of actual service within the jurisdiction is necessary to support a
'The statute provides for actions by residents only. Whether a nonresident
injured on the highways of the state is entitled to the benefit of the statute is
not discussed. It seems that New Jersey may favor its own citizens to this
extent.
'274 U. S. 352 (1927).
'Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Stone.

"American Ry. Express Co. v. Fleishman, Morris & Co., Inc., 141 S. E. 253

(Va. App., 1928).
' McDonald v. Mabee, 253 U. S. 90 (1917).

"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; Flexner v. Farson,248 U. S. 289

(1919).
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personal judgment. Do the cases under discussion meet these
requirements?
It has been suggested in a recent article that a better approach
would be to divide the cases into "normal" and "abnormal," as to
method of service. 9 "Normal" service on a non-resident is characterized by handing him a copy of the process while he is in the
state. The "normal" method of bringing a foreign corporation doing
business in the state into court, either by statute or otherwise, is by
service of process on its agent representing it in such business.10 If
the case is one of "normal" service it is immaterial, in transitory
causes of action, where the cause of action arose."
"Abnormal" service on non-residents and foreign corporations
includes those cases where the statute requires the appointment of
some person as agent for service of process, or upon the doing of
certain acts deems the appointment to have been made. The cases
under discussion are representative of this type of service. In all
cases arising under these statutes, jurisdiction must be upheld, if at
all, under the police power. The exercise of this power, however,
is limited by certain constitutional inhibitions. With respect to individuals these inhibitions are embraced in the due process clause, and
to corporations have been added those of the commerce clause. But
these inhibitions do not prevent a state from regulating the use of
its highways by non-residents ;12 nor from excluding a non-resident
motorist until he appoints a state official as his agent for service of
process in action arising out of his use of the highway ;13 nor from
declaring that the non-resident's use of the highway is equivalent to
such appointment, 14 the difference between a formal and implied
appointment not being deemed substantial as regards the due process
clause. The same conditions may be imposed on foreign corpor'Pennoyer v. Neff, Flexner v. Farson, all supra, note 7; Cabanne v. Graf,

87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461 (1902).
'Bullington, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1928), 6 N. C. L.
Rev. 147, 157.
"Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 205 U. S. 364 (1907).
'Bennick v. Railroad, 103 U. S. 11 (1880). In the "abnormal" case, if the
corporation makes an express appointment, it is bound by the contract, Penn.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917) ; if no such appointment is
made the power of the state is limited to causes of action growing out of

business done in the state. Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n. v. McDonough,
204 U. S. 8 (1906).
"Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915).
"Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916).
" Hess v. Pawloski, supra, note 3.
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ations doing business in the state. 15 The essential element of such
statutes is that they provide a reasonable method whereby notice
may be had by the defendant and an opportunity to defend. The
Virginia statute seems to meet this requirement. However, the dicta
in the case to the effect that the statute would have been valid in the
absence of a provision for notice is doubtful. The weight of authority seems otherwise. 16 Viewed in the light that similar statutes
will doubtless be passed in other states, the holding in the New Jersey
case seems timely and proper. A reasonable provision for notice
being essential to the validity of such statute, the method should be
express and not open to conjecture and speculation.
G. M. HOOD.
CONTRACTS-OFFER

AND

ACCEPTANCE-COMPLIANCE

WITH

OFFER OF REwA D-In a recent decision' the Georgia Court passed
upon the question of compliance with the terms of an offer of reward. Defendant railroad offered a reward for "information resulting in the conviction" of anyone for the crime of interfering with the
tracks so as to endanger the operation of trains. Plaintiff apprehended a negro boy twelve years old and delivered him to the railroad
authorities, to whom the negro admitted that he had broken the lock
on a switch to delay the train in order that he might catch a ride.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant delivered the negro to the juvenile
court which adjudged him delinquent and committed him to the
training school so that he, the plaintiff, could not recover the reward,
the negro boy never having been haled into the superior court.
The lower court dismissed the suit. The appellate court sustained the
dismissal and held that the adjudication in the juvenile court was not
a sufficient conviction to constitute compliance, also citing a statute2
upholding its view as to the adjudication of the juvenile court. The
court takes the view that it cannot be ascertained whether the negro
would have been found guilty or not.
' Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S., 1868) ; International Harvester Co.

v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914) ; "Lienceford v. Ass'n., 190 N. C. 314, 129
S. E. 805.
"Simon v. Southern Ry., 184 Fed. 959 (E. D. La., 1910) ; Knapp v. Bullock
Tractor
Co., 242
Fed. 543 (S.
D. St.
Cal.,
'McCrary
v. Nashville,
C. &
L. 1917).
Railway, 141 S. E. 416 (Ga., 1928).
2Michie's Code, sec. 900 (12): "No adjudication under the provisions of
this act shall operate as a disqualification of the child for any office, state or
municipal, and such child shall not be denominated a criminal by reason of
such adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be denominated a conviction."
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Plaintiff relied upon the Kentucky case of Railroadv. Goodnight8
as sustaining his view, the facts being practically the same as those
of the instant case. In that case the reward was recovered. But the
instant case is clearly distinguishable on the ground that in the Kentucky case it appeared from the record that those apprehended were
guilty, while in the instant case there is little to base guilt upon other
than the confession of the boy, which is not conclusive.
This result might be attacked on the ground that there was a substantial compliance. At first glance it might appear that the court
4
has adopted a strict construction rather than the usual liberal one.
It might be urged that since the negro has been put out of the way
that the defendant has secured what is desired and plaintiff should
recover the reward. In this connection a Delaware case 5 holds that
where an offer was made for information as to who took certain
money and leading to the recovery of it, that, although it was shown
that a person other than the one designated by plaintiff had actually
taken the money, since the money was recovered as a result of his
information, he should recover. A Kentucky case 6 also allows recovery on the ground of substantial compliance where reward was
offered for delivery to the jailer of a fugitive and plaintiff so
wounded the fugitive in making the capture that he died before actual
delivery to the jailer. Williston makes the following comment: "But
offers of reward should 'be construed in the sense in which they are
ordinarily understood and acted upon' and with reference to 'the
purposes for which they were intended.'-z This view is adopted
from a leading Kansas case.8 In the instant case the statute in
reference to adjudication 'by a juvenile court 9 was notice to all persons as to conviction and it should :be properly understood that in
case the person apprehended was a child the juvenile court would
have jurisdiction and there could be no actual conviction. The
Georgia court goes on the ground that it is clear from the terms of
the offer that defendant railroad wanted not merely the putting, out
of the way of the offender but also a conviction to serve as a warning
to all offenders-this appears a proper and reasonable construction.
'Railroad v. Goodnight, 73 Ky. 552, 19 Am. Rep. 80 (1875).
'Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N. W. 769 (1912).
Gilkey v. Bailey, 2 Har. (Del.) 359.
'Mosley v. Stone, 108 Ky. 492, 56 S. W. 965 (1900).

'Williston's Contracts, Vol. I, sec. 74.

'Marsh v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 88 Kans. 538, 129 Pac. 168 (1913).
"Michie's Code, sec. 900 (12), supra, note 2.
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A decision of the Maine Court 10 designates a "court of competent
jurisdiction" as the one necessary to convict in order to have compliance. The juvenile court was the proper court in the instant case
and since it could not convict certainly the terms of the offer have
not been complied with-a reasonable conclusion.
ANDREW C. MCINTOSH.
COURTS-ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT-CLAIMS
AGAINST THE STATE-Two recent North Carolina cases deal with
proceedings to enforce claims against the State." In one case the
plaintiff sought to recover a claim against the State Highway Commission,2 a State agency,3 for work done in compliance with a contract. The action was brought pursuant to the provisions of C. S.
1410 which invokes the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
with respect to claims against the State. 4 The contract provided for
a different rate of payment for certain kinds of work and the only
issue in the controversy is the character of the work performed.
Held, since the issue is only one of fact, the Supreme Court will not
"exercise its recommendatory original jurisdiction and the action
will be dismissed."
The State Constitution5 limits the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
over "issues of fact" and "questions of fact" to the same extent that
the court exercised prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1868,
viz., "to matters exclusively of equitable cognizance."
Therefore
construing sections 8 and 9 of Article IV of our Constitution, the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to matters of law and
legal inference when claims are presented against the State, and any
"Haskell v. Davidson, 91 Me. 488, 42 L. R. A. 155 (1898). "The service
contemplated by a person making such an offer (reward for arrest and conviction), and which the proposal should 'be construed as meaning, must be the
obtaining and giving to some proper person interested, sufficient information
in relation to the perpetrator of the crime, and his whereabouts, as to authorize
and secure the arrest of the offender, and subsequently to secure his conviction
by a court of competent iurisdiction." (Writer's italics and parentheses.)
1Lacy v. State, 195 N. C. 284, 141 S. E. 886 (1928) ; Rotan v. State, 195

N. 2C. 291, 141 S. E. 733 (1928).
Lacy v. State, supra, note 1.
'Carpenter v. R. R., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E. 693 (1922).
4 N. C. Const., Art. IV, sec. 9.
'N. C. Const., Art. IV, sec. 8.
'McIntosh, "Jurisdiction of the North Carolina Supreme Court," 5 N. C.
Law Review 1, 14, for discussion and citation of authorities.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
action brought against the State will be dismissed where the sole issue
7
is one of fact.
The procedure in prosecuting claims against the State is prescribed by C. S. 1410; one provision says, "if an issue of fact shall
be joined on the pleading the Court shall transfer it to the Superior
Court for trial." This provision is not binding upon the Supreme
Court-it is merely directory rather mandatory. The General Assembly can not regulate the methods of procedure in the Supreme
Court.8
The second case was a proceeding instituted in the Supreme
Court by non-resident executors to recover money paid to the State
as an inheritance tax under C. S. 7776 on the order of the State Tax
Commission, an agency of the State. No question of fact was involved. The tax collected was unauthorized and illegal under the
decision of the U. S. Supreme Court holding C. S. 7776 unconstitutional.10 Held, that the "recommendatory originttl jurisdiction" of the
Supreme Court" may not be invoked as the Legislature has pro12
vided an exclusive remedy to recover unauthorized taxes.
A sovereign state cannot be sued without its consent. "The General Assembly alone has the power to determine that a claim against
the State shall be paid or settled. . ."13
".
Of course, a state is
14
subject to suit as authorized by the United States Constitution.
The Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
to hear claims against the State, but its decisions are: (1) recommendatory, (2) no execution shall issue thereon, and (3) reported
to the General Assembly for action thereon. 15 "The Legislature has
power to prescribe and regulate by statute the method of preferring
'Bledsoe v. State, 64 N. C. 393 (1870).

Pearson, C. J., in Reynolds v. State,

64 N. C. 461 (1870), says: "Our recommendatory jurisdiction in regard to
claims against the State does not embrace cases involving mere matters of
fact8 ..."
N. C. Const., Art. IV, sec. 12.
Rotan v. State, supra, n. 1.
'""The subject to be taxed must be within the jurisdiction of the State and
this applies both to transfer and property taxes, and a State cannot tax the
devolution of property from a non-resident to a non-resident, unless it has
jurisdiction of the property." Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S.69, 46 S.Ct.
256 (1926), reversing Trust Co. v. Doughton, 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741
(1924).
See discussions of this case, 3 N. C. L. Rev. 107, 4 N. C. L. Rev. 92.
1 Supra, note 4.
C. S. 7979.
4 Judge Connor, in Rotan v. State, supra, note 1.
2 U. S. Const., Art. III, see. 2; 11th amendment.
" Supra, note 4.
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claims against the State."' 6 The Legislature by statute has waived
its exemption from suit to recover unauthorized taxes.' 7 The claimant under this statute had a right to bring an action in the Supreme
Court to recover the illegal taxes. This statute affords a complete
remedy and is exclusive.' 8 The claimant has failed to pursue this
remedy and the original recommendatory jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court can not be invoked, because this "jurisdiction conferred upon
this Court -by Art. IV, sec. 9, of the Constitution is for the benefit
only of such plaintiffs and to be used only in such cases, as cannot
otherwise obtain a footing in court by reason of the State being a
party."' 9
CHARLES W. McANALLY.
CRIMINAL LAw-SUNDAY LAWS-WORK OF NEcEssITY-Since

1779 there have been statutes on the South Carolina books which
prohibited the sale of merchandise, or the doing of any work of one's
ordinary calling on Sunday, unless the sale so made, or the work so
done, is excused by reason of necessity or dharity. 1 ' After years of
admittedly lax enforcement, a newly elected governor resurrected
these statutes, and ordered that they be rigidly enforced. As a result of this, the petitioner sought, and obtained, an injunction pendente lite, restraining the defendant from interfering with the sale of
gasoline and motor oils on Sunday, since, due to the now universal
use of the automobile as a means of transportation, the sale of gasoline and oil on Sunday has become a necessity within the meaning of
the statute. Upon final hearing before the Supreme Court, however,
the injunction was vacated, the court holding that it could not declare
as matter of law that the sale of gasoline and oil is a necessity, and
not within the penalty for working on Sunday, but that the question
of necessity was for the jury to decide from the facts and circum2
stances of each case.
The opinion leaves a distinct impression that the court does not
deem it proper that it should hold, as matter of law, that the sale of
"CR. R. v. Reidsvoille, 109 N. C. 49, 13 S. E. 865 (1891).
t

Supra, note 4.
Wilson v. Green, 135 N. C. 343, 47 S. E. 469 (1904).

"Blain v. State, 86 N. C. 49 (1882) ; accord: Board of Education v. Board
of Education, 106 N. C. 81, 10 S. E. 1002 (1890) ; Newton v. Highway Commission, 194 N. C. 303, 139 S. E. 613 (1927).
'S. C. Cr. Code 1922, secs. 713-14. North Carolina has a statute, C. S.
3955, very similar to these, which prohibits one doing work of his ordinary
calling on Sunday unless excused by necessity or charity.
'Charleston Oil Co. v. Poulnot, 141 S. E. 454 (S. C., 1928).
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any certain type of merchandise, or the doing of any particular class
of work is a necessity, but that it requires a legislative act to constitute it as such. 3 It is submitted that the court would not follow this
principle to its logical end. Suppose that electric lighting, gas, and
street railway companies 4 or restaurants were to refuse to perform
their services on Sunday, except to those persons who proved that
they required them through necessity, on the ground that the performance of their work on that day, except as necessary, would be
unlawful. Would the Court say to the restaurant operator that he
could serve food only to those who proved it necessary to eat in a
restaurant? Would the court uphold the street car company in
carrying a worshipper to church, but refusing to carry a golf player
to his club? I submit that it would not, but that it would declare as
a matter of law, that the plying of such occupations on Sunday have
become so obviously necessary (necessary not meaning physical or
absolute necessity, but the moral fitness and propriety of the work
done in any case8 ) that to hold otherwise would lead to infinite confusion, and uncertainty as to the position of the law. 6 Thus, it seems
that the better ruling would be that where reasonable minds may
differ, the question of what constitutes a work of necessity within
the Sunday laws is properly a question of fact for the jury, but
where the nature of the law is patent and obvious to the reasonable
"'I am in full accord with the view expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Blease .. .that this court should not undertake to state what condition,
or what state of facts should exist to constitute a necessity .... Whether it
would be better for the law to prescribe what conditions should exist to constitute a necessity is a matter for the wise consideration of our legislative
body, and not for this court." Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Carter.
'The fact that these are public utilities does not change the case. Some

courts have held railroads liable for work done on Sunday, where no necessity
was shown. Ry. v. State, 85 Ark. 134, 107 S.W. 393 (1908). In Western

Union v. Hutchenson, 91 Ga. 252, 18 S.E. 297 (1892), the court said: "The

telegraph company is not put by law, and cannot put itself -by contract, under

any duty to deliver any message on that day unless ...considered as work of
necessity or charity."

'Burns v. Moore, 76 Ala. 339, 52 Am. Rep. 332 (1884) ; Sullivan v. Ry, 82

Me. 196, 19 At. 169 (1889).
"The following are some of the cases in which the courts have held, as
matter of law, that the doing of certain acts is work of necessity regardless of
the facts of each case:
Sale of food: Comm. v. Keithan, 1 Mona (Pa.) 368; delivery of milk:
Topeka v. Hempstead, 58 Kan. 328, 49 Pac. 87 (1897) ; furnishing light: Turner v. State, 85 Ark. 188, 107 S. W. 388 (1907); operating street railways:

Augusta v. Rens, 55 Ga. 126; operating swimming pool: Lakeside Corp. v.

Comm., 134 Va. 696, 114 S.E. 769 (1922).
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mind as constituting a work of necessity, the question becomes one
7
of law for the Court.
If this rule be applied to the sale of gasoline on Sunday, the
Court need not have reached the decision that it did, but might have
upheld the lower court in his opinion that "in these times the automobile is also a necessity, and that the sale of gasoline and motor
oils on Sunday should be deemed a work of necessity under our
modern conditions of life." The automobile has ,become one of our
principal means of travel. If the court can hold, as matter of law,
that the street car operator can be employed in carrying passengers,
regardless of the necessity in each individual case, they could likewise hold that filling station operators, who remain open to serve
patrons requiring gasoline through necessity, may sell to all that
come.
The opinion of the court that the legalizing of the sale of gasoline on Sunday is within the peculiar province of the legislature is
open to criticism.6 The court was not called upon to make new law;
the problem before it was merely to interpret law already enacteda legitimate judicial function. Morals and property are not fixed
qualities; morality has a curious way of ever-changing its tone as
time moves on. Statutes remain hard, general, and static, and it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to breathe the life of each generation into them.
ALvIN S. KARTUS.
EASEMENTS-RIGHT OF WAY OF NECESSITY-DEGREE OF NECESSITY REQuIRED-There is no little confusion in the books over the
question as to the degree of necessity required to create a way of
necessity. The question has recently arisen in the case of Brasington
v. Williams (S. C. 1927) 141 S. E. 375. In this case, egress from
'This

ruling is followed in the following states, among others: State v.

Schatt, 128 Mo. App. 622, 107 S. W. 10, 29 A. L. R. 1301 (1908); Ex parte
Kennedy, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 148, 58 S. W. 129 A. L. R. 1301 (1900); St.
v. Lirnsig, 178 Ia. 484, 159 N. W. 995 (1916) ; Comm. v. Waldman, 140 Pa.
89, 21 AtL. 248, 11 L. R. A. 563 (1891).
'"Have we come to the time when the only way to change a law is by
statute? The changing of law by statute seems to me like mending a garment
with a patch, whereas, the law should grow by the life that is in it, not by the
life that is outside of. it ....
I should hate to think that the law did not derive
its impulse by looking forward rather than from looking backward, or rather
that it did not derive its instruction from looking about and seeing what the
circumstances of men actually are, and what the impulses of justice naturally
are

.

. .

,"

remarks of Mr. Woodrow Wilson at the annual convention of the

Am. Bar Ass'n., on October 20, 1914.
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the plaintiff's land was obstructed on three sides by a river, which
could be traversed only by bridge or ferry, neither of which existed.
The plaintiff claimed a right of way of necessity over land of the
defendant, lying on the fourth side, between the plaintiff's holding
and the public road. A temporary way over land of a third party,
also lying between the plaintiff's land and the public road, had been
abandoned because of prohibitive cost, it appearing that the cost of
establishing and maintaining a way at that place would be greater
than the entire worth of the plaintiff's farm. Held, the plaintiff was
entitled to a way of necessity.
It is agreed that a grant of a way of necessity cannot be implied
from proof that the land cannot be conveniently occupied without
it ;1 its foundation rests in necessity, not in convenience. 2 A number
of cases hold that the degree of necessity required is "strict necessity;"3 and the foundation of the right of necessity is the fact that
the lands are physically inaccessible except by passing over other
lands ;4 and so the fact that the existing way is steep or narrow, 5 or
can be made available only by expenditure of money or labor,6 has
been held not to justify a finding of a way of necessity. Other courts
maintain the view that the degree of necessity required is a reasonable
necessity,7 and so, if the cost of construction or maintenance of
another way as a means of egress would invole very great expense,
1 Childs v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 213 Mass. 91, 99 N. E. 957 (1912) ; Roper
Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N. C. 161, 73 S.E. 902 (1912);
Milliken v. Denny, 141 N. C. 224, 231, 53 S. E. 867 (1906) ; Bailey v. Gray, 53
S. C. 503, 31 S.E. 354 (1899).
See supra, note 1.
U. S. v. Rindge, 208 Fed. 611, 620 (1914) ; Hill v. Wing, 193 Ala. 312, 325,
69 So. 445 (1915) ; Lapique v. Morrison, 29 Cal. A. 136, 137, 154 P. 881 (1916) ;
Hildreth,v. Googins, 91 Me. 227, 39 A. 550 (1898). "A way of necessity is of
strict necessity .... The way sought as one of necessity must be indispensable." Hill v. Wing, supra.
'Pettingill v. Porter,8 Allen (Mass.) 1, 85 AmD. 671 (1864) ; Paine v.
Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385, 32 N. E. 18 (1893). "It is well established that a
way of necessity can only be claimed and held where it furnishes the only
way by which access may be had to the property of the claimant." Lapique v.
Morrison, supra, note 3.
'Kripp v. Curtis, 71 Cal. 159, 11 P. 879 (1886) ; U. S. v. Rindge, supra,
note 3.
1 Gaines v. Lunsford, 120 Ga. 370, 47 S.E. 967 (1904) ; Dee v. King, supra,
note1 1; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102, 35 AmD. 302 (1834).
Stone v. Burkhead, 160 Ky. 47. 169 S.W. 489 (1914) ; Fisheries Co. v.
Tohnan, 210 Mass. 402, 97 N. E. 54 (1912); Muse v. Gish, 114 Va. 90, 75
S. E. 764 (.9.2); Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219, 38 Am. Rep. 671 (1881);
Crotty v. Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78, S.E. 233 (1913) ; Lawton v. Rivers, 2
McCord (S. C.) 446, 15 AmD. 622; Carmon v. Dick, 170 N. C. 305, 87 S.E.
224 (1915).
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or be out of proportion to the value of the land itself, a way of
necessity is justified. 8 Also, reasonable access to a highway over a
navigable body of water prevents the maintenance of a way of
necessity over the lands of another,9 but where the way by water is
unavailable to meet the requirements of the natural uses thereof, a
way of necessity will be implied. 10
The rule adopted in the instant case is that "the necessity must be
actual, real, and reasonable, as distinguished from inconvenience,
but it need not be absolute and irresistible necessity." This view
represents the weight of modern authority and seems logically correct. The right of 'way is implied in accordance with the presumable
intentions of the parties that the land shall not be without any means
of access thereto. 1 ' It seems, therefore, if it is practically impossible
to get out otherwise than over the grantor's land, or the cost of obtaining or maintaining a way out would exceed the value of the land
itself, or be greatly disproportionate thereto, it may well be supposed
that the parties intended that the grantee should have a way out over
the land of the grantor. On the other hand, if the way out over the
grantor's land was merely the more convenient way, it could hardly
be contended that the parties contemplated that the grantee should
acquire a right of way over the grantor's land as a mode of egress.
R. T. GILEs.
GUARDIAN AND WARD-INVESTMENT
OF TRUST FUNDs-In
Sheets v. Tobacco Co.' plaintiffs sought to recover funds which their
guardian had invested in preferred stock of the defendant corporation, on the ground that, as the investment was not authorized by
statute, the guardian had no power to so invest the wards' money.
The guardian having been made a party defendant, it was held that
he would not be liable if he acted in good faith and used due
diligence in making the investment and his liability must be established before plaintiff can proceed against defendant corporation.
This case makes good faith and due diligence the principal factors
in determining a guardian's liability for making an investment not

8 Smith v. Griffin, 14 Colo. 429, 23 Pac. 905 (1890) ; Watson v. French, 112
Me. 371, 92 At. 290 (1915) ; Pettingillv. Porter,supra, note 4; Ipswich Gramfier School v. Jeffrey's Neck Pasture, 174 Mass. 572, 55 N. E. 462 (1900).
'Hildreth v. Googins,supra, note 3; Turnbull v. Rivers, 14 S. C. L. 131, 15
AmD.
1 622 (1869).
Ipswich Graminer School v. Jeffrey's Neck Pasture, supra, note 8.
'2 Tiffany, Real Property, p. 1302.
'Sheetsv. Tobacco Co., 195 N. C. 149; 141 S. E. 355 (1927).
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authorized by statute and not in pursuance of an order of court.
Guardianship is obviously a trust of highest character.2 The guardian sustains a quasi parental relation,3 and the ward is often so young
as to be entirely dependent on his guardian. The legislature recognized the precariousness of the ward's position when it passed a
statute specifying the character of securities in which a guardian may
invest his ward's funds. 4 The legislature neither originally nor by
subsequent amendment 5 saw fit to authorize investments in the stock
of private corporations.
It was not the intent of the legislature to legalize certain types
of investments that had theretofore been illegal, for the statute includes government securities which have always been legal investments, even in the absence of statute.6 The purpose of the statute
must have been to enumerate the types of investments that a guardian
might legally make. By implication all other investments are made
at the guardian's peril, and he should be liable in case of loss. Unauthorized investments will bind the parties to the transaction, 7 but
the ward should be given the protection intended by statute by
making the guardian liable for any loss resulting. The statute does
not make good faith and due diligence an excuse for non compliance
with its terms.
The court in the principal case goes on the theory that good faith
and due diligence are not required where the investment was authorized by statute. By this theory the purpose of the statute is merely
to release the guardian from his duty to exercise care and diligence
in making the authorized types of. investments.
Other investments are also proper and the guardian will not be
liable for losses if he acts in good faith and uses due diligence. The
court says, "If the investment was made under statutory authority,
or pursuant to order of court, the guardian cannot be held liable for
losses resulting therefrom, in the absence of fraud or gross negligence. In the case of investments not so expressly authorized, the
good faith and due diligence of the guardian may be challenged, and
if successfully challenged, he will be held liable for any and all losses
resulting from the investment."
' Brandon v. Greer, 48 So. 519, 520; 95 Miss. 100 (1909).
In the matter of Mary Ellen Andrews, L. P, 8 Q. B. 153 (1873).
4C.S. 4018.

'C. S. 4018 (a).
'Smith v. Smith, 7 March (Ky.) 328 (1832). See Lamar v. Micou, 112
U. S. 452, 467 et seq. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221 (1884).
"See Wright v. Wright (Tex.), 155 S. W. 1015 (1913).
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It is well enough to excuse the guardian from his duty to exercise
care and diligence in case of investments made pursuant to an order
of court, for the investment is made under the court's supervision
and there is no need for care and diligence on the part of the guardian. The guardian only has to comply with the court's order 8 and
has no fiduciary responsibility as to that particular transaction. If
the guardian complies with the order, he is not liable for loss resulting from the character of the investment. 9 In case of an investment
made under statutory authority there is no one except the guardian
to determine the propriety of that particular investment, and he
should not be released from the exercise of care and diligence commensurate with his trust.10 A guardian must always use the same
care and diligence in handling his ward's funds that he would use in
handling his own, 1 and should be required to use good faith and
due diligence to excuse himself from liability for making any investment, even if authorized by statute.
The early English rule permitted a guardian to invest his ward's
funds only in real estate mortgages or government funds, 12 and the
rule has been followed in some American decisions where there were
Other cases hold that where the charno statutes on the subject.'
acter of the investment is prescribed by statute, as in the principal
4
It
case, the guardian may invest in the prescribed securities only.'
has been held that an investment in stock of private corporations is
improper and renders the guardian liable for loss irrespective of
good faith and due diligence. 15
The law requires the guardian to invest his ward's surplus funds
and he will be liable for his failure to do so. 16 But the law should
not impose a duty to inyest in securities unauthorized by statute, and
'Anderson v. Anderson, 165 Pac. 145 (OkI., 1916).
'Corcoran v. Kastrometinoff, 164 Fed. 685, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 399 (1908)
Baldy v. Hunter, 98 Ga. 170, 25 S. E. 416 (1896) (affirmed 171 U. S. 388, 43
Law Ed. 208).
" See Whitford v. Foy, 65 N. C. 265 (1871).
'Atkinson v. Whitehead, 66 N. C. 296 (1872); Hurdle v. Leath, 63 N. C.
366 (1869).
' Lewin on Trusts (7th ed.), 282, 283, 287.
" See Lamar v. Macon, 112 U. S. 452, 467, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221 (1884).
" Amer. Surety Co. v. Sperry, 171 Ill. App. 56; Matter of Young, 170 N. Y.
S. 303 (1918).
Warrell's Appeal, 23 Pa. 44 (1854);
40 N.
v. Talbot,
" King
182 IIl.
76, Y.
55,76N. (1869)
E. 192; (1899).
Penn.
v. Folger,
v. McCombs, 65 N. C. 186
9"Sudderth
(1871); Burke v. Turner, 85 N. C.
500 (1881) ; Wilson v. Lineberger, 88 N. C. 416 (1883) ; Matter of Ward, 98
N. Y. S. 923 (1906).
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good faith and due diligence should not excuse the guardian from
loss resulting from such unauthorized investments.
C. W. HALL.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LANDLORD'S DUTY TO RE-RENT PREMISES-In a recent North Carolina case,' tenants refused to enter a
building especially constructed for them under a rental contract for
a term of two years. After six months, when it appeared that the
tenants were not going to occupy the premises, the landlord remodeled the building and leased it to other parties. The landlord sued
for damages for breach of the lease reckoned on the cost of remodeling the building, and on loss of rent for the entire term, and had a
verdict for a sum which included only such rent as had accrued
under the contract up to the time of the second remodeling. Held,
that the trial court erred in limiting the damages to only such rent
as had accrued.
In a companion case,2 a tenant abandoned premises five years
before the expiration of his lease. The landlord had a verdict based
on the contract price less such sum as the landlord would realize
from the use of the property by good husbandry for the remainder
of the term. Held, that the correct amount to be deducted from the
rent reserved in the contract is the fair rental value of the premises
for the remainder of the term, and that the burden is on the tenant
to show what the fair rental value is.
It has long been held in North Carolina that when a tenant
abandons premises or refuses to enter, the landlord may lease to
another without thereby terminating the tenant's liability for rent.
In view of this ruling the question was recently discussed in this
REvIEw 3 whether it should be the duty of the landlord to minimize
his damages in jurisdictions such as North Carolina where he may
reenter the premises without working an eviction of the tenant, or
a forfeiture or surrender of the lease. It was there suggested that
to recognize a disability on the part of the landlord to claim for
damages which, by reasonable efforts, he could have obviated or
reduced, is the better and more salutary rule as conducive to justice
and sound business economy.
In the instant cases the court applies the rule of avoidable con1

Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N. C. 274, 142 S. E. 12 (1928).
'Womble v. Leigh, 195 N. C. 282, 142 S. E. 17 (1928).
'Note, "Landlord's Duty to Re-Rent Premises," 6 N. C. L. Rev. 68 (1927).
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sequences and the landlord is allowed only to recover the rent for
the contract period, less the fair rental value of the premises for the
remainder of the term. This is a culmination of the present day
development of the law of landlord and tenant which is away from
the feudal theory of privity of estate and toward the modern conception of contractual obligation.
These recent decisions have placed North Carolina in a class
with a few other jurisdictions which have had the perspicacity to
identify leases with contractual obligations to the extent of applying
to contracts of lease the principles governing the effect of repudiation, breach and rescission of other contracts.
While the decisions are basically sound it remains to call attention to several subordinate questions which arise thereunder. First,
as to the holding that a recovery may be had of damages based on
rentals to accrue in the future.4 In regard to contracts of personal
service North Carolina recognizes the principle that there can be no
recovery for damages before the expiration of the term because of
the other rule, that the master is entitled to diminish them by the
amount the servant may or could have received from other employment, which cannot be determined until the full period is at an end.
In Hendrickson v. Anderson,5 the court said: "It would seem to be
a dictate of reason that if one party to a contract be injured by the
breach of it by the other, he ought to be put in the same condition
as if the contract had been fully performed on both sides. He certainly ought not to be a loser by the fault of the other; nor can he
be a gainer without introducing into a broken contract the idea of
something like vindicative damages. The true rule, then, is to give
him neither more nor less than the damages which he has actually
sustained; and so we find the authorities to be." Therefore the court
holds that the future or anticipatory damages are too uncertain and
speculative to allow a recovery of the full amount before the end
of the term. 6
There are authorities elsewhere to the contrary, but in North
Carolina where such a rule is adopted in regard to contracts of personal services, is there any justification for a different rule in regard
to contracts of lease? Now that leases have been divested of the
"Hendrickson v. Anderson, 50 N. C. 246 (1858) ; Brinkley v. Svincegood,
65 N. C. 626 (1871) ; Smith v. Lumber Co., 142 N. C. 26, 54 S. E. 788 (1906).
'Supra, note 4.
See also McMullen v. Dickinson Co., 60 Minn. 156, 62 N. W. 120, 27 L.
R. A. 409, 51 Am. St. Rep. 511 (1895) ; Bauer, Damages, p. 238.
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incidents of an estate, apparently the only reasons for a difference
is the fact that realty has a comparatively stable value, whereas the
worth of services fluctuates according to the increase or decrease of
personal skill. But, does this difference in degree merit a difference
in result ?
The placing on the tenant of the burden of proof as to the possibility of re-letting is likewise of interest. Where the landlord sues
for rent that has already accrued, his recovery under the principles
of these decisions would seem to be the contract price, less such revenue as he could reasonably have secured by re-letting during that
period, or less the rent actually received from another letting, or the
fair worth of the premises where the landlord enters and uses the
premises himself. In this case the burden of proof can be better
borne by the landlord in view of the difficulty of the tenant in ascertaining the facts as to the possibility of re-letting.7 But, as in the
instant cases, where the landlord is allowed to sue for rent before it
accrues his recovery is the contract price less the fair rental value
of the premises for the remainder of the term; and the burden is on
the tenant to show what the fair rental value of the premises is in
the open market. The burden of proof can be borne by the tenant
in this case because it is a simple matter to show the fair rental value.
But while the rule imposes no great hardship on the tenant, yet it is
illogical and an anomaly. Where a landlord sues for breach of the
lease, he must prove the contract and show a wrongful breach of the
agreement. If he rests there he has made out a case for nominal
damages only. It is elementary that if the plaintiff desires to recover
other than mere nominal damages, he must prove his actual damages.8 The court holds that the correct rule for ascertaining his
actual damages is the contract price, less the fair rental value for the
remainder of the term.9 Therefore until he has proved the fair
rental value in addition to a wrongful breach of the lease he has not
made out his case as to the damages. And to put the proof of the
fair rental value on the tenant is to require him to support the landlord's burden. Consequently in this latter case the burden of proof
should be on the landlord as a requisite of his prima facie case of
actual damages; and in the former case the burden should likewise
be on the landlord because he is better able to bear it.
'Supra, note 3, at 71, n. 19.

' 17 C. J. 720, §59.

'Supra, note 2, at 284.
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There is one possibility not determined by the instant cases which
is of practical importance in advising landlords. Where the tenant
breaches the lease and the landlord does not enter will his damages
likewise be reduced by the fair rental value of the premises? Probably the court would so hold. The law should not penalize the landlord who enters for the purpose of minimizing his damages by subjecting him to the rule of avoidable consequences, and at the same
time permit the indolent landlord to recover the full contract price.
A. L. BUTLER.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-BANKS

AND BANKING-IMPUTATION

OF

FORGERY-CERTAINTY OF CHARGE-PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY-

Defendant bank returned a check, drawn by one M. D. Wicker to the
order of the plaintiff and negotiated by the plaintiff, with notation
"Signature Forged." Plaintiff sues for libel. Judgment for defendant on ground of qualified privilege.'
With the result of the case there can be no quarrel, but one of
the questions submitted to the jury was: "Did the notation on said
check and the return thereof to the Wlikins-Ricks Company (firm to
which plaintiff negotiated the check) amount to a charge against the
plaintiff that he had forged the same, or uttered the same, knowing
it to be forged, as alleged in the complaint ?"
One element of libel is that the alleged libellous statement must
refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person.2 The words must
refer to the party bringing the action at least with reasonable certainty.3 Where the words are ambiguous or admit of two constructions, it is a question for the jury, and the plaintiff may introduce
evidence of extraneous circumstances to prove that the words were
used of him and in an actionable sense.4 In some jurisdictions it is
competent for him to introduce those who heard the words to testify
as to their actual interpretation. 5 But where the words are unambiguous, the question of whether or not they refer to the plaintiff is
for the court,6 and it has been held that in such a situation witnesses
'Fields
v. Page Trust Co., 195 N. C. 304, 142 S. E. 7 (1928).
2
Harris v. Santa Fe Townsite Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 506, 125 S. W. 77

(1910); Argabright v. Jones, 46 W. Va. 144, 32 S. E. 995 (1899).
'Talbot v. Mack, 41 Nev. 245, 169 P. 25 (1917).

"Ball v. Evening American Publishing Co., 237 Ill. 592, 86 N. E.

1097

(1908).
'Newell, Slander and Libel (4th edition), section 270.
'Mosier v. Stoll, 119 Ind. 244, 20 N. E. 752 (1889); Harris v. Santa Fe
Townsite Co., supra, n. 2.

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
may not be introduced to prove extraneous facts when there are no
insinuations in the words to be explained.7 Nor can innuendos render certain a person otherwise not certain. 8
It seems, then, that the above question should not have been put
to the jury, as the mere notation, "Signature Forged," did not charge
the forgery to the plaintiff with any reasonable certainty. And it
did not charge the plaintiff with uttering a forged instrument. 9 It
imputed neither a criminal intent nor a guilty knowledge, and without guilty knowledge there can be no uttering of a forged instrument within the definition of that crime. To render the notation
actionable plaintiff would have to aver extraneous facts about the
manner of uttering it or the intent with which it was uttered. 10 It
is obvious that no such averments could be made in the instant case."
Plaintiff should have been nonsuited. 12
HENRY BRANDIS, JR.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-LIFE EsTATES-ACCRETIONS TO CORPORATE STOCK AS BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN-The

testator's will gave to his wife a life estate in all his real and personal
property. This included fifteen shares of capital stock in a bank;
two shares were retired at a gain, and the present value of the other
shares is more than double the original value, due to undivided profits.
'Mueller v. Radebaugh, 79 Kan. 306, 99 P. 612 (1909).

'Argabright v. Jones, supra, n. 2.
'Velikan e v. Millichap et. al., 67 Wash. 138, 120 P. 876 (1912), where defendant had written a third party that a remittance due from defendant to
such third party had been delayed "by reason of one Velikanje (the plaintiff)
presenting us with forged receipts purporting to be from our agents in your
city, and trying to collect your money on them." See also Couran v. Penn, 159
Mo. App. 664, 140 S. W. 82 (1911).
'Fensky v. Maryland Casualty Co., 264 Mo. 154, 174 S.W. 416 (1915);
Andrews v. Woodmansee, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 232 (1836).
'Itmight be argued that defendant meant to charge either the plaintiff or
some unknown person who gave the check to the plaintiff. It is obvious, however, that defendant meant to charge only the person signing the check, whomever he might be, and an inference that this designated the plaintiff would not
follow reasonably. Assuming, however, that the notation was alternative as
to the person charged, plaintiff would still have the 'burden of proving that he
was the person designated. Kenworthy v. Journal Co., 177 Mo. App. 327, 93
S. W. 882 (1906). If the words charge a group of persons without exception
any of the group may recover, but if they merely charge undesignated members of the group those seeking to recover must prove, by extraneous circumstances, that they were intended. Newell, Slander and Libel (4th edition),
cases digested in sec. 221. And no such circumstances have here been shown.
" Newell, Slander and Libel (4th edition), sec. 718: "The court willU generally direct judgment of nonsuit to be entered for the defendant .... (2) If
there is no evidence that the words refer to the plaintiff."
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The Court held, that the life tenant was entitled to the earnings and
dividends undeclared, as well as the amounts gained upon the retired
shares.'
The English view of long standing seems to be that all stock
dividends go to the remainderman, while all the cash dividends go to
the life tenant. 2 This is merely a broad, rough statement of the
rule.8
In the United States it has been said 4 that the "general rule" is
that cash dividends 5 as income go to the life tenant, while stock
dividends as capital go to the remainderman. More definite is the
distinction that ordinary, regular cash dividends go to the life tenant,
while accumulated, extraordinary dividends go to the remainderman ;6 yet, we find one case which declares that these too are for the
life tenant.7 The "increased" 8 or "enhanced" 9 value goes to the remainderman generally, 10 but every dividend presumptively goes to
the life tenant" and the burden is on the remainderman to show
that it is "capital."'2

Thus in this country we find several theories,-and considerable
confusion.
The instant case mentions the Massachusetts and the South Carolina rules.' 8 The first of these is our nearest approach to the English rule. It holds that all dividends in the form of new stock go to
the remainderman, all cash dividends from earnings to the life
tenant.' 4 Under this rule the tenant gets the bare income; the un'Gist v. Craig, 141 S. E. 26 (1927-S. C.). Supported by Wallace v. Wal-

lace, 90 S. C. 61, 72 S. E. 553; Cf. Richmond v. Richmond, 196 N. Y. 535, 89
N. E. 1111 (1909) ; In re Letterle, 248 Pa. 95, 93 A. 935 (1915).
'Bench v. Sproule, 12 App. Cases, 385; In re Hopkins, 18 L. R. Eq. 696.
8
Brandon v. Brandon, 4 Ves. Jr. 800 (1799).

'Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547, 65 A. 1056 (1907).

' Trefy v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N. E. 904 (1918).
'Ballantine v. Young, 79 N. J. Eq. 70, 81 A. 119 (1911 Ch.).
Int re Balch'g Estate, 162 N. Y. S. 940 (1917-N. Y. Sur.).
'Lauinan v. Foster,157 Iowa 275, 135 N. W. 14 (1912).
Bains v. Globe Bank & Trust Co., 136 Ky. 332, 124 S. W.
"'In re Gerry, 103 N. Y. 445, 9 N. E. 235 (1886) ; In re Graham, 198 Pa.
216, 47 A. 1108 (1901) ; Varatta v. Carr, 229 Ill. 47, 82 N. E. 267 (1907);
Letcher v. German Nat. Bank, 134 Ky. 24, 119 S. W. 236 (1909).
nAppeal of Boyer, 224 Pa. 144, 73 A. 320 (1909) ; Soehnlein v. Soelnlein,
146 Wis. 330, 131 N. W. 739 (1911).
' Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452, 88 A. 697
(1912); Appeal of Boyer, supra, n. 11.
' Gist v. Craig, supra, n. 1.
'Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 108-leading case-(1868); Lyman v. Pratt,
183 Mass. 58, 66 N. E. 423 (1903) ; Boardman v. Boardman, 78 Conn. 451, 62
A. 339 (1905) ; De Koven v. Alsop, 205 Ill. 309, 68 N. E. 930 (1903).
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divided or undeclared profits go with the corpus to the remainderman.
The South Carolina (also known as the Pennsylvania) Rule
ignores this distinction 'between cash and stock dividends, and looks
to the apportionment of earnings between life tenant and remainderman according to the time when the earnings were made, rather than
when or how the dividends were declared. 15 Whether earnings were
before or after the gift took effect determines who takes them.
The remainderman is treated harshest by the New York, or Kentucky, Rule. This rule disregards both the time of earning and the
distinction between stock and cash dividends, giving to the life tenant all dividends representing accumulated earnings. 1'
Many courts which have not squarely adopted one or the other
of these rules have hinted at their theories -by adopting parts of the
rules I7 The last rule considered seems to be the most arbitrary of
all, though one of the simplest in application. The Massachusetts
Rule, too, commends itself by its simplicity while holding true to the
sound fundamental that the enhanced value, 18 as an incident of the
corpus, should go to the remainderman. New stock issued is backed
by the entire capital stock; thus, under the rule of this case and under
the New York Rule the life tenant taking earnings in the form of
stock, takes also the increased value of the corpus, which should go
to the remainderman. However, the rule of the instant case, though
perhaps difficult in application, is attractive by reason of its inherent
fairness. Ultimately the tenant taking for a period of time should
"Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368-leading case-(1850) ; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 At. 124 (1907) ; Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545, 28 A.

565 (1894); Soehnlein v. 'Soehnlein, supra, n. 11.
"6Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778-leading case-(1892).

Cited and approved: Cax v. Gaulbert, 148 Ky. 407, 147 S. W. 25 (1912);

McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N. Y. 179, 48 N. E. 548 (1897).

The New York court swung away from this rule in: In re Hartean, 304
N. Y. 292, 97 N. E. 726 (1912).
New York, apparently, adopted the South Carolina rule in: In re Osborne,

200 N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723 (1913).
"Maine-time,

75 Me. 570.

or earnings accrued, ignored: Richardson v. Richardson,

Minn.-no distinction between cash and stock dividends: Goodwin v. Mc-

Gaughey, 108 Minn. 248, 121 N. W. 6.
U. S. S. Ct.-Stock dividends are part of the corpus: Gibbon v. Mahon,
136 U. S. 549.
Va.-Kauftnan v. Woolen Mills, 93 Va. 673, 25 S. E. 1003.
"Gibbon v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 10 S. Ct. 1057 (1890) ; U. S. Trust Co. v.
Heye, 224 N. Y. 242, 140 N. E. 645 (1923).
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own every fair incident of ,his estate, 19 and the distribution of earnings made during that period, or accruing during that interval, should
be made liberally in favor of the owner of the life estate. The two
important elements to be remembered in every case are-the testa20
tor's intention, and the particular facts of the individual case.
D. S. GARDNER.
USURY-SALE

OF SECURITIES AT DISCOUNT-INNOCENT

PUR-

CHASE-C. S. 2306 discourages intentional usury by forfeiting the
entire stipulated interest and by giving the borrower a right to recover double that sum if paid, or an equal right of counter claim
when sued on the instrument by the guilty party or even by an innocent holder for value'-a rule rather harsh on the latter but
thought necessary to uphold the object of the statute and logically
supportable in part on the theory that the contract to pay interest is
2
void.
Now comes the case of Smith v. Page Trust Co. (1928) 195 N. C.
181, 141 S. E. 575, to present a new angle of the question. Smith
sought a loan from defendant trust company which declined the accommodation but offered to market his note at ninety cents on the
dollar, which they did, crediting the net proceeds to his account with
them. On this theory, which the evidence justified, the trust company is Smith's agent and having loaned him no money, cannot be
guilty of usury. Judgment for defendant is therefore correctly affirmed. But what if suit had been against Page and Company to
whom the trust company sold Smith's paper? The trust company
being only Smith's agent it follows that Page and Company were in
reality loaning money to Smith at ten percent discount plus six percent interest.3 If Page and Company knew the facts-obviously a
'"Ellis v. Flannigan, 279 Ill. 93, 116 N. E. 618 (1917); Murphy v. Whitney,
140 N. Y. 451, 35 N. E. 930 (1894).
' The present trend, as well as the numerical weight of authority, is with
the Pennsylvania Rule. The case here noted refers to it as the South Carolina Rule; it is also called the American Rule. Those wishing to make a more
elaborate review of the authorities will find the following notes helpful:

118 Am. St. Reps. 162; 12 Ann. Cas. 647; Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1218; Ann. Cas.
1915 A, 311; 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 563; 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 510.
'Faison v. Grandy, 126 N. C. 827, 36 S. E. 276 (1900), and citations.
'N. I. L. has not changed this. Brannan, Negotiable Instruments, (4th ed.)
p. 440.
'If the money had already been loaned to Smith at lawful interest and the
note had later been sold by the trust company at ten percent discount the loss
would be theirs and no usury would be involved. See Gaul v. Willis ?1856) 26
Pa. 259.
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jury question-it would seem that they would be liable to Smith. If
they did not, the statutory provision that usury must be "knowingly"
received would seem to protect them, though as a simple matter of
justice it is hard to see why they should be preferred over an innocent purchaser for value of paper already tainted but not evidently
4
tainted with usury.

' Cf. Sabine v. Paine,223 N. Y. 401, 119 N. E. 849 (1918) and Brummel and
Co. v. Enders, 18 Gratt. 873 (Va. 1868).

